> ## Documentation Index
> Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.x402layer.cc/llms.txt
> Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.

# Confidential Compute

> How TEEs, attestation, and end-to-end encryption keep your workloads private and verifiable on the Singularity Cloud Network.

Confidential compute means your data stays private **even from the machine running it**. The Singularity Cloud Network achieves this with hardware **Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs)**, **remote attestation**, and **end-to-end encryption** for AI inference.

## Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs)

A TEE is a hardware-isolated enclave (e.g. Apple Secure Enclave, Intel TDX/SGX, AMD SEV-SNP, AWS Nitro) where code and data are protected from the host OS, the operator, and other processes. Memory is encrypted and access-controlled by the CPU itself.

On the network, every compute node runs inside a TEE — so the operator hosting your workload cannot inspect it.

## Remote attestation

Before a node can serve, it produces a hardware **attestation** — a signed proof, rooted in the CPU vendor, that it is a genuine enclave running the expected software. The network verifies this; only **attestation-verified** nodes receive work.

When you run inference, the response is tagged with the serving node's attestation so you can confirm it ran in a real enclave (see [Confidential inference](/cloud/grid/confidential-inference)).

## End-to-end encryption (AI inference)

For Grid inference, privacy goes one step further than "TEE on the server":

* Your client fetches the serving node's public key and **encrypts the prompt in your browser/app**, sealed to that specific enclave.
* The network **relays only ciphertext** — the orchestrator never sees your prompt or the response in the clear.
* The node decrypts **inside the enclave**, runs the model, and **seals the reply back to your key**.

So the plaintext exists only in two places: your device, and the hardware enclave. Not in transit, not in any database, not with the platform.

<Note>This is why Grid chat history is never stored server-side — the platform cannot read it by design. Any history is kept client-side.</Note>

## What this protects against

* A malicious or compromised **operator** reading your prompts.
* The **platform** logging or training on your data.
* **In-transit** interception (the relay only ever holds ciphertext).

## What to still consider

* The **model output** is only as private as where you send it next.
* Attestation proves the enclave is genuine and running approved software; always verify the attestation badge for sensitive workloads.